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Abstract –Individuals might abstain from participating in an instance of an evolutionary game
for various reasons, ranging from lack of interest to risk aversion. In order to understand the
consequences of such diverse activity patterns on the evolution of cooperation, we study a weak
prisoner’s dilemma where each player’s participation is probabilistic rather than certain. Players
that do not participate get a null payoff and are unable to replicate. We show that inactivity
introduces cascading failures of cooperation, which are particularly severe on scale-free networks
with frequently inactive hubs. The drops in the fraction of cooperators are sudden, while the
spatiotemporal reorganization of compact cooperative clusters, and thus the recovery, takes time.
Nevertheless, if the activity of players is directly proportional to their degree, or if the interaction
network is not strongly heterogeneous, the overall evolution of cooperation is not impaired. This
is because inactivity negatively affects the potency of low-degree defectors, who are hence unable
to utilize on their inherent evolutionary advantage. Between cascading failures, the fraction of
cooperators is therefore higher than usual, which lastly balances out the asymmetric dynamic
instabilities that emerge due to intermittent blackouts of cooperative hubs.
Evolutionary game theory [1,2] is the theoretical frame-
work of choice for studying the evolution of cooperation
in social dilemmas [3]. In evolutionary games strategies
with a high fitness proliferate, while strategies who fail to
reproduce are destined to disappear through natural se-
lection. The problem in the realm of social dilemmas is
that the strategy that ensures the highest individual fit-
ness is defection, while the society as a whole is best off if
everybody would cooperate. The expectation therefore is
that cooperative behavior should not have evolved under
such circumstances. Yet cooperation in nature abounds
[4–6], even under circumstances that constitute a social
dilemma, and it is difficult to reconcile this with the funda-
mental assumptions of natural selection that are described
in Darwin’s The Origin of Species. Indeed, widespread al-
truistic cooperation is an important challenge to Darwin’s
theory of evolution, and knowing how it evolved is fun-
damental for the understanding of the main evolutionary
transitions that led from single-cell organisms to complex
animal and human societies [7].
Due to the universal appeal of the subject, ample re-
search efforts have been invested towards reconciling the-
ory and observations, and several mechanisms have been
identified that promote cooperation in evolutionary social
dilemmas. While Hamilton’s kin selection theory [8] and
various forms of reciprocity and group selection are prob-
ably the most famous examples [9], many refinements to
these fundamental mechanisms have been proposed and
explored. Evolutionary games in structured populations,
in particular, have recently attracted considerable atten-
tion [10–14], as it becomes clear that methods of statistical
physics [15, 16] can be employed successfully to study the
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evolution of cooperation on networks.
It has been discovered that the emergence of coopera-
tion and the phase transitions leading to other favorable
evolutionary outcomes depend sensitively on the structure
of the interaction network and the type of interactions, as
well as on the number and type of competing strategies
[17–26]. Theoretical studies that are unique to physicists
have led to significant advances in our understanding of
the evolution of cooperation, for example by revealing the
importance of heterogeneity of interaction networks [20] or
the dynamical organization of strategies [22], to name just
two examples. Keeping pace with theoretical advances are
also human experiments [27–32], which are becoming more
and more common.
An important assumption behind existing research,
however, has been that players always participate in each
round of the game [33]. In reality, however, players will
often abstain from competition, for example due to lack
of interest or to mitigate risk. In this letter, we therefore
consider evolutionary social dilemmas where the partici-
pation of each player at a particular round of the game is
probabilistic rather than certain. We note that our con-
sideration of inactivity is different from the consideration
of loners [18]. Loners refuse to participate and rather rely
on some small but fixed income, yet they are always active
and can replicate. In our case, an inactive player always
gets a null payoff and is unable to replicate. Moreover,
we consider inactivity as a dynamically changing state of
players rather than a strategy. As we will show, inac-
tivity introduces cascading failures of cooperation, which
only under special circumstances are compensated by the
inactivity-induced inability of defectors to utilize on their
inherent evolutionary advantage over cooperators.
Formally, we study pairwise evolutionary games on
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) random networks and on scale-free (SF)
networks generated according to the uncorrelated config-
uration model [34], each with an average degree k = 4
and size N = 104. At this point, we note that the con-
sideration of different activity patterns does not affect the
expected outcome of social dilemmas in well-mixed popu-
lations. During each pairwise interaction, mutual coop-
eration yields the reward R, mutual defection leads to
punishment P , and the mixed choice gives the coopera-
tor the sucker’s payoff S and the defector the temptation
T . Within this setup we have the commonly employed
weak prisoner’s dilemma game [35] if T > R > P = S.
Without loss of generality we use R = 1, P = S = 0 and
T = b ≥ 1 as a representative setup for a social dilemma.
Cooperators (C) and defectors (D) are initially distributed
uniformly at random, so that they have equal chances for
success during evolution.
Simulations are performed in agreement with a syn-
chronous updating protocol, such that each player i plays
the game with all its ki neighbors and thereby collects
the payoff Πi. Once all the players collected their pay-
offs an evolutionary step take place. For the evolution of
strategies, we employ the replicator dynamics, such that
if Πj > Πi, player j will replicate its strategy sj to the
site of player i with the probability
Psj→si =
Πj −Πi
max(kj , ki)b
. (1)
We perform simulations until the average fraction of coop-
erators in the population 〈C〉 becomes time independent,
that is, until a stationary state has been reached.
To introduce different activity patterns, we assign to
every player an activation probability ai ∈ [0, 1] according
to which player i participates in a particular round of the
game. Accordingly, with probability 1 − ai the player i
remains inactive in each round of the game. If a player i
is active, it will play the game with all its ki neighbors,
independently from whether they are active or not, and it
will obtain the payoff Πi as dictated by all the strategy
pairs. If a player i is inactive, it will not play any games
with with its neighbors, and accordingly, its payoff Πi will
be null. Furthermore, only active players are able to pass
their strategy in agreement with the replicator equation,
while inactive player are never able to replicate because
their payoff is always zero (and hence never larger than
the payoff of the neighbor).
The introduction of different activity patterns has two
important effects on the evolutionary dynamics. First,
the activation probabilities introduce a degree of hetero-
geneity to the evolutionary time scales, which in repeated
settings can strongly affect the outcome since some play-
ers will be more active than others. Second, the additional
layer of stochasticity (participation is probabilistic) in the
spatiotemporal dynamics affects the correlation scales and
can induce cascading effects that disrupt the formation of
cooperative clusters. Based on these facts, it is clear that
the distribution of activation probabilities in the popula-
tion plays a crucial role. Accordingly, we consider power-
law distributions of the form Q(a) ∼ aτ , where τ is a
free parameter that determines the slope of the line on a
double-logarithmic scale. Furthermore, we consider sep-
arately (i) that ai are completely independent of ki, and
(ii) that ai = ki/kmax where kmax is the largest degree in
the network. In the latter case, which applies specifically
for SF networks, we thus assume a so-called topology-
correlated activity pattern, while in the former case the
activity of each player is uncorrelated with its degree. If
topology-correlated activity applies, this means that hubs
of the SF network will practically always be active, while
low-degree players will participate only once per several
time steps. Conversely, if activity and degree are uncorre-
lated, hubs too can experience long inactivation periods.
As we will show next, this distinction has particularly im-
portant consequences for the overall evolutionary success
of cooperative behavior.
We begin by presenting results obtained on SF networks
when the activity pattern is uncorrelated with the degree
of players. As shown in Fig. 1, for low and mild temp-
tation the traditional version of the prisoner’s dilemma
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Fig. 1: Degree-uncorrelated activity patterns on SF networks
impair the evolution of cooperation. Depicted is the aver-
age fraction of cooperators 〈C〉 in the population in depen-
dence on the temptation to defect b, as obtained with the tra-
ditional prisoner’s dilemma game (Traditional PD) and with
three different τ values characterizing the activity-driven pris-
oner’s dilemma game (Activity PD).
game consistently returns significantly higher average lev-
els of cooperation than activity-driven prisoner’s dilemma
games while, as b increases, differences tend to disappear.
Moreover, it can be observed that the higher the hetero-
geneity in the distribution of activation probabilities (the
more negative the value of τ), the more impaired the evo-
lution of cooperation. Although the differences that are
generated by different values of τ are fairly small, they
are nevertheless telling in terms of the negative effect in-
activity has on cooperative behavior. In particular, if the
activation probability is uncorrelated with the degree of
players, chances are high that even some of the hubs will
be inactive over extended periods of time. This has dire
consequences for the evolution of cooperation since dor-
mant cooperative hubs are unable to sustain a compact
mass following of low-degree cooperators, which is the key
mechanism behind elevated levels of cooperation [20].
However, if the activity pattern is correlated with the
degree of players, such that hubs are assigned the highest
ai values, the average level of cooperation in the station-
ary state becomes comparable to the outcome obtained
with the traditional prisoner’s dilemma game. Results
presented in the main panel of Fig. 2 attest clearly to
this fact, and this in turn validates our explanation be-
hind the impaired evolution of cooperation presented in
Fig. 1. Indeed, if hubs are relatively unaffected by inac-
tivity, the reasonable expectation is that the evolution of
cooperation should not suffer. Yet the notable difference
in variance in 〈C〉 as a function of b shown in the inset of
Fig. 2 indicates that this is only partly the reason why the
evolution of cooperation remains intact. Identical mean
values but different variance indicate that the evolution-
ary dynamics leading to the stationary state is different,
which we therefore explore further in more detail.
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Fig. 2: Degree-correlated activity patterns on SF network do
not impair the evolution of cooperation. The main panel shows
the average fraction of cooperators 〈C〉 in the population in
dependence on the temptation to defect b, as obtained with
the traditional prisoner’s dilemma game (Traditional PD) and
with the activity-driven prisoner’s dilemma game where ai =
ki/kmax. The inset shows the variance in 〈C〉 (σ2) as a function
of b. Note that despite the similarities in 〈C〉, the difference in
σ2 is significant.
Results presented in Fig. 3 reveal the reason behind the
difference in the variance reported in the inset of Fig. 2.
The time courses of the fraction of cooperators in the
presence of a heterogenous yet degree-correlated activity
pattern are significantly more undulating than the time
courses for the traditional prisoner’s dilemma game. In
comparison, the differences between the top and the bot-
tom panel are most striking precisely in the intermediate
region of b values, where also the largest differences in
σ2 are recorded in the inset of Fig. 2. Elaborating on
these differences, we find that the activity-driven game,
for example at b = 1.9, is subject to sudden drops in 〈C〉,
which reoccur intermittently across the whole history of
the game. The recovery periods are comparatively slow.
Qualitatively similar instabilities have been observed be-
fore in the realm of evolutionary dynamics, for example in
the prisoner’s dilemma game with asymmetric influence
[36], or in presence of imitation and mutation [37, 38]. In
our case, however, the instabilities are due solely to the in-
troduction of activation probabilities to individual players.
Moreover with regards to the differences, we find that in-
between the cascading failures, the level of cooperation is
actually higher than in the traditional version of the game.
Over time, the formerly described negative effect due to
cascading failures and the latter positive effect cancel each
other out, ultimately giving rise to the same average frac-
tion of cooperators in both cases, as shown in the main
panel of Fig. 2.
To obtain further insights into the intriguing temporal
complexity of the evolution of cooperation driven by het-
erogeneous activity patterns, we show in Fig. 4 how the
state of the main hubs of the SF network varies over time,
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Fig. 3: Degree-correlated activity patterns on SF networks in-
troduce cascading failures of cooperation. The drops in the
fraction of cooperators are sudden, while the spatiotemporal
reorganization of compact cooperative clusters, and thus the
recovery, takes time (top panel). Comparatively, in the tradi-
tional version of the prisoner’s dilemma game (bottom panel),
the time evolution is smooth and without significant deviation
over time. In both panels we show the time evolution of the
fraction of cooperators 〈C〉, as obtained for different values of
temptation to defect b (see legend).
and how these changes correlate with the drops in 〈C〉.
In essence, the inactivity increases the chance of a coop-
erative hub to become invaded by a defector. The lower
the rank of the hub, the higher this probability. We quan-
tify this explicitly in the main panel of Fig. 5, where the
drop is the more likely the lower the activation probabil-
ity ai. As soon as a hub changes from state C to state
D, the drop in 〈C〉 is unavoidable and sudden because
defectors invade cooperators fast and do not require any
spatiotemporal organization to do so. When the hub is
reoccupied by a cooperator, however, the recovery takes
a while longer because cooperators, unlike defectors, do
require the formation of compact clusters to spread (win
back lost ground in this case). To confirm that these sud-
den drops in the level of cooperation are indeed due to the
activation patterns, we show in the inset of Fig. 5 the dis-
tribution of times between consecutive drops. Evidently,
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Fig. 4: Degree-correlated activity patterns on SF networks in-
termittently render cooperative hubs inactive, following which
system-wide cascading failures of cooperation occur. Note that
the lower the rank of the hub, the lower its activation proba-
bility, and thus the higher the probability that a C state will
be switched to a D state. The drops have a characteristi-
cally asymmetric shape since defectors can invade immediately
without prior spatiotemporal organization, while cooperators
require more time to reorganize into compact cluster and re-
gain lost ground. Depicted is the time evolution of 〈C〉 and
state C (C = 1 cooperation, C = 0 defection) of the five most
connected nodes in the network (see legend), as obtained for
b = 2.0. Here ai = ki/kmax.
the power-law distribution is a direct consequence of the
imposed activity pattern. But as long as cooperators do
occupy the hubs, in-between the cascading failures, the
lower-degree cooperators benefit from the inactivity since
they suffer from it much less than defectors. More pre-
cisely, a low-degree cooperator will be unable to spread
regardless of its activity, but a low-degree defector is likely
to spread, if only it is active enough. As a result, the
phase between the drops is characterized by higher 〈C〉
levels, which together with the intermittent drops results
in more or less the same final average level of cooperation
as recorded in the traditional prisoner’s dilemma game.
Lastly, we show the results obtained on ER random net-
works, where like in the case of degree-correlated activity
patterns on SF networks shown in Fig. 2, different activity
patterns also do not impair the evolution of cooperation.
This confirms that the particularities of the activity pat-
tern play a particularly important role on strongly hetero-
geneous interaction networks, while the evolution on lat-
tices, small-world and random networks is comparatively
little affected. Since notable hubs on such networks are ab-
sent, the activity pattern, even if uncorrelated with degree
(the distinction between degree-uncorrelated and degree-
correlated activity actually plays no role), does not induce
such sudden and fast drops in the fraction of cooperators
as we have reported in Figs. 3 and 4. The clustering of
cooperators is of course occasionally disrupted by inactive
players that quickly fall prey to defectors, but this just
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Fig. 5: The switch from cooperation is the more common the
lower the activation probability. Depicted is the number of
C → D changes for the 100 most connected players in depen-
dence on their activation probability ai. The inset shows the
distribution of times δ between consecutive drops in 〈C〉. Here
a drop is defined as a monotonous decrease in 〈C〉 by at least
0.005 (50 players on a network of size N = 104). These statis-
tics have been collected after a transient period of 105 time
steps when the entire simulation run for 3.5 × 106 time steps
in the degree-correlated activity model with b = 2.0. Points in
the main panel are the average over intervals of 0.1 in ai.
counteracts what the defectors lose by having an overall
lower potency to invade due to the imposed periods of in-
activity. On average, the cooperation level thus stays the
same, or perhaps slightly tilted in favor of cooperators at
intermediates values of b.
Summarizing, we have studied the impact of diverse ac-
tivity patterns on the evolution of cooperation in evolu-
tionary social dilemmas. We have focused on the weak
prisoner’s dilemma on random and scale-free networks.
The different activity patterns have been implemented
through individual activation probabilities, according to
which players were either active or inactive during a par-
ticular round of the game. While active agents played the
game with all their neighbors and obtained their payoffs
accordingly, inactive players did not play and thus ended
up with a null payoff. Consequently, only active players
were able to pass their strategies to their neighbors, while
inactive players were unable to replicate.
We have shown that degree-uncorrelated activity pat-
terns on SF networks significantly impair the evolution of
cooperation. This is due to the fact that elevated levels
of cooperation on SF networks require fully functional, al-
ways active hubs. Thus, in case one or several hubs were
assigned a low activation probability, the average level of
cooperation in the population dropped significantly. As
is well known, cooperative hubs act as important centers
of sizable and compact communities of cooperators [20].
And if these hubs are rendered inactive for extended pe-
riods of time, then obviously their support for extensive
cooperative communities to emerge is no longer provided.
1 1.5 2 2.5
b
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
<
C>
Traditional PD Random Net
Activity PD  τ = −1.5
Activity PD  τ = −2.5
Activity PD  τ = −3.5
Fig. 6: Different activity patterns on ER random networks
do not impair the evolution of cooperation. Depicted is the
average fraction of cooperators 〈C〉 in the population in de-
pendence on the temptation to defect b, as obtained with the
traditional prisoner’s dilemma game (Traditional PD) and with
three different τ values characterizing the activity-driven pris-
oner’s dilemma game (Activity PD).
Conversely, when we have considered degree-correlated ac-
tivity patterns on SF networks, such that predominantly
low-degree nodes were affected by extensive periods of in-
activity, we have found that the evolution of cooperation
is, at least on average, not negatively affected. Although
sudden and steep drops in the level of cooperation still oc-
curred, they were compensated by an overall higher level
of cooperation in-between the cascading failures. Interest-
ingly, we have demonstrated that, as long a cooperators
do occupy the hubs, the lower-degree cooperators benefit
from the inactivity since they suffer from it much less than
defectors. In particular, defectors are unable to utilize on
their inherently higher payoffs, which lastly balances out
the asymmetric dynamic instabilities that emerge due to
intermittent blackouts of cooperative hubs.
We have further corroborated this conclusions by study-
ing the impact of different activity patterns on random ER
networks. In this case, cooperators rely predominantly on
traditional network reciprocity [35], rather than on the
enhanced version of the same mechanism that works on
SF networks due to the strong heterogeneity of the degree
distribution. Accordingly, the distinction between degree-
uncorrelated and degree-correlated activity patterns plays
no role. Indeed, we have shown that even a random assign-
ment of activation probabilities fails to lower the average
level of cooperation in the population. As much as coop-
erators lose by having their clustering process disrupted
by occasionally inactive players that quickly fall prey to
defectors, the defectors lose by having an overall lower po-
tency to invade due to the imposed periods of inactivity.
On average, and regardless of correlations between inac-
tivity and the degree of players, the cooperation level thus
stays the same.
We conclude by noting that our study is only the first
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step towards the introduction of different activity patterns
in evolutionary games, which ought to properly take into
account the diversity of not only the applied strategies,
but also the diversity of individual activity levels of play-
ers [39, 40]. However, already the simplest consideration
has revealed remarkable complexity in the evolutionary
dynamics, involving cascading failures that manifest as
asymmetric dynamic instabilities in the time course of the
evolution of the two competing strategies. An interesting
direction for future research certainly involves human ex-
periments with an exit option, as studied before in dictator
games [41, 42]. Future simulations might involve players
being able to change their activity patterns dynamically
over time, for example depending on their evolutionary
success in previous rounds of the game. Relative times
scales in evolutionary dynamics [43] could also play an
important role, in that the typical time for an “activation
change” might be different from the strategy change. To
explore the consequences of these options appears to be an
exciting venture with many relevant implications, and we
hope that this letter will motivate further research along
this line in the near future.
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